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Trade Sustainable Impact Assessment and the new challenges 
of trade liberalization 
 
Abstract 
Trade SIAs have been conceived to help policy makers to maximise trade-offs in the liberalisation process, 
assuming that positive trade-offs ultimately exist across sustainable development pillars. Existing Trade SIAs 
tend to anticipate objective impacts of trade liberalisation at global level. To that aim, they use indicators that are 
likely to give an image of the reality after liberalisation. The relevance of these indicators for sustainable 
development and the relevance of their aggregation rest on each society’s views and priorities on sustainability. 
Indeed, the varied appreciations of trade liberalisation’s impact values – meaning impact valued within each 
society, and not only physical impact value  - explain much of WTO negotiators’ misunderstanding in trade 
talks. Trade SIAs, by unveiling differences in the valuation of trade liberalisation impacts across countries, could 
ideally help trade negotiations progress in areas where convergence in sustainability meanings and values has 
been made clear. In the meantime, it should help isolate deadlocks stemming from apparently incompatible 
views on what sustainability means for each different country. By reviewing and comparing the challenges of 
trade liberalisation in 1999 and 2006 from a Trade SIA perspective, we argue that new directions for Trade SIAs 
seem needed, which we summarise in conclusion. 
Keywords: Trade liberalisation, sustainable development, sustainable impact assessment 
1. Introduction 
 
Trade SIAs originated in the particular context of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations on trade liberalization, a few months before the WTO Ministerial 
Conference was convened in Seattle in November 1999. Increasing concern over the 
social and environmental impacts of the previous liberalization cycle (The Uruguay 
Round, 1986-1994), sharp criticism of WTO opacity in final decision-making, from 
which developing countries and NGOs were excluded, in addition to the protracted 
and worrying difficulty of the EU defending its own preferences on particular issues 
such as agriculture, cultural goods, and environmental standards, were all warning 
signals – much more clear now than they were at the time – that WTO trade 
negotiations were very likely to be disrupted and that the EU would be found guilty of 
such a disruption, along with a few OECD countries. All three signals turned to red a 
few weeks before Seattle. The Ministerial Conference ultimately collapsed.  
 
Trade SIAs were still at the development stage at this time and were unable to 
prevent the failure of the Seattle and, later on, the Cancun WTO Ministerial 
Conferences. They nevertheless deserve undisputed praise for having seriously 
considered the three aforementioned warning signals, through their bid to rebalance 
trade liberalization outcomes across sustainable development pillars, countries and 
stakeholders.  
 
Seven years later, what has been achieved? This is the question behind our work. 
Trade SIAs have benefited from substantial improvements over this period, with 
numerous applications to both multilateral and bilateral trade liberalization 
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agreements1, a published handbook2, and all such achievements made possible by 
perennial funding from the European Commission. Meanwhile, the multilateral trading 
system has found itself “in the dizzying aftermath of a roller coaster ride”3, ending in a 
stalemate on July 24 2006, when WTO trade negotiations were officially suspended.  
 
The background of explanatory factors behind the postponement of the Doha Round 
seems rather similar to the situation in 1999. Developing countries are still asking for 
a fairer agreement, enabling them to reap disproportionate gains when compared to 
developed economies – their voice is simply louder and the threat of a veto taken 
more seriously by developed countries than seven years ago. Transparency and 
participation, though improved since the Seattle ministerial Conference, remain a 
controversial issue. Finally, throughout the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005 
the EU suffered a sustained crossfire of complaints for its stringency on agricultural 
market access, in spite of its claim to be the most developing country-friendly of all 
OECD economies4. As a consequence, this would suggest that Trade SIAs have not 
made the contribution to trade talks, and particularly to the European Union’s trade 
position, that might have been expected5.  
 
In this paper we argue that Trade SIAs have done little to benefit trade negotiations 
firstly because trade negotiation hurdles have dramatically changed over the 1999-
2006 period in spite of superficial similarities, and secondly, because Trade SIAs 
have failed to address a number of important factors that cause negotiators to resist 
free trade today.  
 
2. A comparison of 1999 and 2006 negotiation contexts 
 
Though any diagnosis of who is to blame for the Doha Development round deadlock 
is politically sensitive, a reasonable reading of the current WTO crisis is that 
considerable misunderstanding prevails across member countries, which relentlessly 
argue that they have already reached their breakeven point and that they cannot 
concede more – in terms of market access or subsidy cuts – without incurring net 
negative social returns on their concessions6.  
 
This point is one of the major innovations of the current period in comparison with 
1999. It was indeed admitted in 1999 that trade talks needed to be rebalanced across 
sustainable development pillars, member countries and stakeholders; there was no 
misunderstanding about this point. The naming of the current Round as “the Doha 
Development Round” acts as a kind of reminder of such imbalances. Substantial 
                                                 
1 Kirkpatrick C., George C. and S. Scrieciu, “Sustainability Impact Assessment of Proposed WTO Negotiations. 
Final Global Overview Trade SIA of the Doha Development Agenda” Final Report. IARC University of 
Manchester, July 2006.  
2 “Handbook For Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment”, European Commission, External Trade, March 2006. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf 
3 Bhagwati J. (2004). In Defense of Globalization. Oxford University Press. 
4 The EU, and France in particular, were deemed to be “excessively defensive on agricultural issues” by Pascal 
Lamy in an interview given to Le Monde, 24 February 2006. 
5 NGO Statement on EU Trade Policy SIAs, 2002, available at http://www.foeeurope.org.  
6 See Voituriez T. (2007), “Soyons généreux, soyons égoïstes : le Cycle du Développement à l’OMC” Economie 
Rurale 291, Jan-Feb 2007: 11-17. See also “The Doha Development Agenda: Sweet Dreams or Slip Slidin’ 
away?“, Speech by Pascal Lamy, International Institute of Economics, Washington, 17 February 2006. 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl19_e.htm 
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efforts have been made ever since to rebalance the trade negotiation process. 
Leading developing countries (Brazil and India) figured among the Five Interested 
Parties that took the initiative in 2004 to re-launch trade talks and draft the July 
package – an initiative that would have been confined to the Quad countries (EU, 
US, Canada, Japan) under GATT and during very early WTO times. The July 
package and its subsequent versions themselves included far more concessions 
from OECD countries in favor of developing countries than could have been achieved 
during the Uruguay Round. To quote Pascal Lamy, “The ‘agricultural package’ — if I 
may call it so — that we had before us in July, had nearly all the makings of a deal 
that would have represented a QUANTUM LEAP from the results of the Uruguay 
Round”7.  
 
Yet although enough efforts were made for the EU and the US to claim that the 
playing field was now sufficiently leveled for reciprocal concessions to occur on a fair 
basis, the development objective of the current round creates this seemingly 
inextricable situation where developing countries are entitled to ask for more, and 
developed countries claim they carry a significant share of the effort burden, shifting 
the responsibility for failure onto their neighbor next door. And whereas vocal NGO 
leaders called for a “sustainable development round” in 1999, with consensual 
reference to sustainable development pillars, now a “fair development round” is the 
priority, with no consensual notion of what such fairness should imply8.  
 
The paradigmatic shift from “sustainable development” to “development” and 
“fairness” is not a purely semantic issue. What we would like to stress at this stage is 
simply that should a Trade SIA be created from scratch against the new background 
provided by “development” and “fairness” priorities, while retaining the similar 1999 
objective of helping negotiators improve trade sustainability, then the information 
such a Trade SIA should convey would be rather different from that initially expected.  
 
Table 1 captures the salient features of the 1999 and 2006 backgrounds. The first 
column recalls what the issues at stake were in 1999, during the “take-off” period for 
Trade SIAs. It isolates the three sustainable development pillars, participation and 
market access issues, as briefly outlined above. The third column does the same with 
today’s – i.e. the 2006 – context. A development focus (e.g. inequality and poverty 
reduction) has replaced the sustainable development focus that prevailed in 1999. 
Participation issues have somehow been moved away from the WTO itself (the 1999 
situation) towards third countries participation – and particularly “weak” or “poor” 
states – and whatever the WTO member country in question, towards domestic 
participation in defining the position of negotiations within countries. Finally, market 
access impediments, though still of concern, are now accompanied by harsh debate 
on policy space, own liberalization agendas and the overall effect of trade discipline 
on the design of domestic subsidies – what Pascal Lamy called in 2004 the “social 
fabric” or “collective preferences” issue, a concept we will return to in the following 
sections. Between these two columns, the second column displays some of the 
salient milestones that have paved the way from 1999 to today’s situation. The last 
row provides the implicit references or benchmarks against which the issues listed in 
                                                 
7 “The Quantum Leap of the Doha Round”, remarks by Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General, at the Cairns Group 
20th Anniversary Meeting, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl39_e.htm 
8 See Joe Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All, issued in December 2005 during the WTO Hong-Kong 
Ministerial Conference.  
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each of the three columns are expressed. The changes along the three rows of the 
table – i.e. from 1999 to 2006 issues – are developed in the coming sections.  
 
Table 1: Issues at stake and achievements, from Seattle to Hong-Kong  
1999, issues at stake “Negotiation roller coaster” 1999-
2005 achievements 
2006, issues at stake 
 
Three sustainable 
development pillars 
The “institutionalization” of the 
environment: Doha Declaration on 
Trade and Environment; WTO 
Special Sessions of the Committee 
on Trade & Env. 
 
Focus on poverty: the Millennium 
Development Goals 
Development (poverty and 
inequality) focus: 
Who gains, who loses? 
Dynamic effects of trade on 
growth and development? 
Participation WTO public symposia for non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) 
 
Amicus curiae briefs from NGOs can 
be received by Panels (Dispute 
settlement) 
 
Cotton initiative exemplifies NGOs’ 
commitment and firmer grip on trade 
agenda 
Weak state participation 
 
Within-country participation 
 
Participation in standard setting, 
public/private partnership 
Market access “Will International Rules on 
Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading 
System?”9. 
 
“Debunking the fallacies on 
agricultural market access”10 
 
“Own trade liberalization provides 
the highest gains”11 
Collective preferences, 
disclosure and compatibility 
across countries 
 
Reconsidering market access 
gains: long-term (productivity 
effects) gains; services & 
investment. 
References/benchmark:  
Uruguay Round, World 
Earth Summit 
References/benchmark: 
Seattle collapse 
References/benchmark: 
No reference: what should a fair 
development round look like? 
Source: Authors 
 
                                                 
9 Bagwell K. and R.W. Staiger (2005). ““Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?” 
Mimeo, Columbia University, New York. 
10 Panagariya A. (2004). “Agricultural Liberalization and the Developing Countries: Debunking the Fallacies”. 
Mimeo, Columbia University, New York. 
11 Anderson K. and W. Martin (eds.) (2006). Agricultural Trade Reform & The Doha Development Agenda. The 
World Bank, Washington DC and Palgrave Macmillan. 
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3. From “sustainable development” to a “development” focus  
 
3.1. The story so far 
 
The trade and sustainable development debate dates back further than 1999. One 
can recall the growing international concern regarding the impact of economic growth 
on social development and the environment in the early 1970s, leading in 1972 to the 
Club of Rome’s report The Limits of Growth12; the Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment and, ultimately, the creation of a Secretariat within the United 
Nations – the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) – the same year.  
 
A twofold change occurred in the 1990s. First, the 1992 World Earth Summit (WES), 
during the political birth of “sustainable development”, ranked environmental issues at 
the top of the agenda – suffice it to recall the three international conventions the 
WES led to: biological diversity, climate change, and desertification. Sustainability 
implicitly meant environmental sustainability13. The second change lies in the 
convergence of ideas further to the WES, stemming from UN bodies (UNEP, CTE) 
and GATT/WTO, towards the common belief that trade and environment could work 
hand in hand, or to put it in another way, that trade liberalization should be 
compatible with environmental protection provided that flanking measures targeted at 
environmental trade impacts accompanied trade liberalization. The so-called “win-
win” scenarios (freer trade, better environmental protection) quickly flourished in 
academic literature in the wake of the inception of the WTO. “Win-win” solutions were 
and still are a common objective of the UN environmental bodies and the WTO. 
 
Ten years after the World Earth Summit, The Plan of Implementation adopted at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 thus reiterated 
the need to “promote open, equitable, rules-based, predictable and non-
discriminatory multilateral trading and financial systems that benefit all countries in 
the pursuit of sustainable development [and] support the successful completion of the 
work program contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration”14. Conversely, the WTO 
integrated explicit references to sustainable development in its various texts, which 
had been far from the case under GATT. GATT-think originally rested upon the 
assumption that environmental policies could distort and hamper trade. The Director-
General of the GATT secretariat submitted a document to the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference warning of the “real danger that in attempting to combat pollution, 
governments may unwittingly introduce new barriers to trade”15. But the WTO made a 
significant shift and adopted a more balanced approach to sustainable development 
issues. First, “sustainable development” appears as an objective of the Organization 
in the WTO Preamble. This objective was reiterated in the 2001 Doha Declaration 
whereby trade ministers told the world: “We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the 
objective of sustainable development... We are convinced that the aims of upholding 
                                                 
12 Meadows D.H., Meadows D.L., Randers J. and W.H. Behrens (1972), The Limits to Growth, New-York: 
Universe Books. 
13 Sampson G.P. (2005). The WTO and Sustainable Development. United Nations University Press. 
14 WTO (2002), "Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development", Geneva: WTO Secretariat, 
WT/CTE/W/220/Rev.1. 
15 GATT (1971), Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade, GATT studies in International Trade, 
Geneva: GATT Secretariat. 
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and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and 
acting for the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development can and must be mutually supportive”16. Hence, within the WTO, 
sustainable development was no longer (or not only) a suspicious pretext 
governments could use to escape trade liberalization, but it also became an objective 
that trade could help them meet. In this regard, the 2001 Doha Conference, by 
launching negotiations on issues related to trade and environment, marked the 
ultimate culmination of the institutionalization of the environment (on behalf of 
sustainable development) within the world trading system. 
 
When looking at ideas and knowledge, and not only at institutions, a similar shift may 
be seen, firstly towards a focus on environment and trade issues, while attempting 
secondly to demonstrate – in line with Bhagwati and Ramaswami’s arguments – that 
undistorted trade is compatible with sound and efficient national environmental 
policies17. The two volumes of the book “Fair Trade and Harmonization” by Bhagwati 
and Hudec18 are undoubtedly one of the benchmark references supporting this 
argument, along with Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor’s contributions in the early 
2000s19.  
 
Figure 1: “Trade” and “Environment” in academic literature, a statistical 
overview 
Number of references to "Trade" and "Environment" 
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 Source: authors, JSTOR Database 
 
When focusing on methodological aspects, it is striking to see that most of the 
breakthroughs in sustainable impact assessment occurred in the 1990s, during the 
environmental institutionalization phase within the world trading system, with the 
founding contributions of the OECD20, UNEP21, the EU22 and the North American 
                                                 
16 WTO (2001), Doha Declarations: The Doha Development Agenda, WTO Secretariat. 
17 Bhagwati J. and V.K. Ramaswami (1963). “Domestic Distorsions, Tariffs, and the Theory of Optimal Subsidy”, 
Journal of Political Economy 71: 44-50. 
18 Bhagwati J.and R. Hudec, R. (Eds.) (1996): Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
19 Antweiler W., Copeland B.R. and M.S. Taylor (2001). “Is Free Trade Good for The Environment”, The American 
Economic Review 91(4): 877-908. See also Copeland B.R. and M.S. Taylor (2003). Trade and the Environment. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press.  
20 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Assessing the Environmental Effects of 
Trade Liberalization Agreements: Methodologies. Paris: OECD 2000, available at http://oecdpublications.gfi-
nb.com/cgi-bin/OECDBookShop.storefront/EN/product/222000011P1. Organization for Economic Cooperation 
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Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)23, most of them dealing first and 
foremost with environmental issues. A retrospective and chronological look at the 
academic contributions on “trade and the environment” from the 1950s onwards 
provides a striking insight into the way in which the aforementioned institutionalization 
of the environment in the world trading system was indeed accompanied – and partly 
caused – by a growing trend in academic papers on the subject, culminating between 
Seattle (1999) and Doha (2001) (figure 1). The tide then turned, along with the 
momentum on environmental issues within the WTO.  
 
Conversely, in the wake of Seattle and Doha, literature on trade, poverty, and 
inequality experienced a fascinating expansion, with institutional bodies such as 
DFID24, UNDP25, UNCTAD26, the World Bank27 and the IMF28 issuing their own 
reports on these subjects, firstly because poverty and inequalities reached the top of 
the agenda at this time, Doha oblige, and secondly because evidence provided so far 
on the positive relationship between trade and inequality had been made on too 
rough a basis, and particularly on cross-national regressions whose validity was 
weak and whose lessons could no longer hold when considering the disaggregated 
effects of trade on a country, on a case-by-case basis29. Transmission channels from 
world trade down to poverty and inequality have been scrutinized and tentatively 
systematized within a comprehensive framework ever since30.   
 
The shift towards the prioritization of social impact assessments for trade 
liberalization does not mean of course that nothing happens on the environmental 
front any more. It nonetheless highlights the nerve center of today’s negotiations and 
methodological agitation. And it turns out that the priority given today to poverty and 
inequality reduction – or “development” in short – closes the circle opened by the 
Bruntland report in 1987 when it adopted the term “sustainable development” and 
drew attention to the link between the environment and development by identifying 
poverty as a principal cause of environmental degradation; what had become known 
as the “pollution of poverty”31.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Development (OECD), Assessing the Environmental Effects of Services Trade Liberalization: A Methodology. 
Paris: OECD, 2002, available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/com-td-env(2000)123-final.  
21 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Reference Manual for Integrated Assessment of Trade 
Related Policies. Geneva: UNEP, 2001, available at: http://www.unep.ch/etu/etp/acts/manpols/rmia.htm.  
22 Colin Kirkpatrick, et al., Further Development of the Methodology for a Sustainability Impact Assessment of 
Proposed WTO Negotiations. University of Manchester. Institute for Development Policy and Management, 5 April 
2002, available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/past.htm.  
23 North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (2000) Assessing Environmental Effects of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Available at 
http://www.cec.org/pubs_docs/scope/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=14.  
24 DFID (2000). Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalization Work for the Poor. White Paper on International 
Development. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/whitepaper2000.pdf. See also  
25 Rodrik D. (2001). The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really Mattered. UNDP. See also UNDP 
(2001). Making Global Trade Work for People. 
26 UNCTAD Trade and Development Reports, issued on a yearly basis. See in particular Trade and Development 
Report 2004, Policy coherence, development strategies and integration into the world economy. 
27 The World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001.  
28 Geoffrey J. Bannister and Kamau Thugge, 2001, "International Trade and Poverty Alleviation," IMF Working 
Paper No. 01/54 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
29 Francisco Rodriguez, Dani Rodrik (1999): "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to Cross-
National Evidence"; NBER Working Paper No. W7081. 
30 L. Alan Winters, 2000, "Trade Liberalization and Poverty," paper prepared for the United Kingdom's Department 
for International Development (Brighton, United Kingdom: University of Sussex). 
31 See WCED (1987), Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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3.2. Challenges 
 
The “development shift” obliges experts and scientists to answer the following 
question: what are the distributive impacts of trade that are worth documenting to 
better help governments integrate trade policies within a global policy framework so 
as to enhance growth and reduce poverty and inequalities. A recent ABCDE 
Conference paper, developed within the framework of this project, presented possible 
answers to this question, from which two key challenges stand out32.    
 
The first deals with the identification of the winners and losers of trade liberalization 
within countries. Though politically and socially inescapable, the question of loss 
mitigation for losers has been given cautious and distant attention in multilateral trade 
debates, mainly because in a welfare economics approach, the common belief in 
international trade states that “the gains of the winners [...] are big enough to more 
than compensate the losers”33. This initially confined losers’ fate to a domestic issue 
rather than a trade issue, until “development” and “fairness” were brought to the 
forefront in trade debates. 
 
The second challenge arises from the division of labor across countries, and 
particularly along the value chains of traded products. The fairness of a development 
round, as determinedly stated by international NGOs such as Oxfam, implies 
answering a question rather more tricky than the one raised by Ricardo: the issue 
now is not so much what products a country should export, but at what stage of the 
value-adding process firms in any given country should specialize. 
 
The third challenge is imposed by development itself, which is a dynamic process. 
Assessing the dynamic effects of trade openness on development – in both positive 
(growth for instance) and negative (unemployment, poverty) aspects, is a challenge 
still unmet. 
 
                                                 
32 Chabe-Ferret S., Gourdon J., Marouani M.A. and T. Voituriez (2006). ”Trade-Induced Inequalities: 
Assessment Issues and Policy Implications for Developing Countries”. Paper presented at the World 
Bank ABCDE Annual Conference, Tokyo 29-30 May 2006. 
33 Samuelson P. (2004). “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists 
Supporting Globalization”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(3): 135-146. 
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4. From “more” to “better” participation 
 
4.1. The story so far 
 
The official story of NGO participation in the world trading system underlines the 
significant and positive changes that occurred after the WTO was created. According 
to the official WTO website, when Ministers adopted the Marrakesh Agreement in 
1994, they also decided to include a specific reference to Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in Article V:2. On 18 July 1996, the General Council further 
clarified the framework for relations with NGOs by adopting a set of guidelines 
(WT/L/62) that "recognizes the role NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the 
public in respect of WTO activities". These guidelines are instrumental for both 
Members and the WTO Secretariat in maintaining an informal and positive dialogue 
with the various components of civil society. Since 1996, arrangements for NGOs 
have essentially focused on attendance at Ministerial Conferences, participation in 
issue-specific symposia, and the day-to-day contact between the WTO Secretariat 
and NGOs34. Looking at participation in terms of approximate volume, the evolution 
of NGO participation in the most spectacular WTO events – the Ministerial 
Conferences – could undoubtedly be best described by a sharp and unprecedented 
increase between Singapore and Hong-Kong (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: NGO participation in WTO Ministerial Conferences, 1996-2005 
(number of NGOs attending) 
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Source: Authors, WTO Database 
 
But it could easily be argued that greater participation in WTO conferences gives very 
little information on the quality of such participation, and particularly that it says 
almost nothing as to whether WTO transparency and accountability has improved 
over this period. As pointed out by Charnovitz, “The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
is frequently criticized for insufficient transparency and for a lack of participatory 
                                                 
34 WTO, “Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm   
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opportunities for private individuals and civic society”35. Criticisms include the 
following: “WTO business is conducted by committees and panels that meet behind 
closed doors in Geneva, Switzerland; [...] in sharp contrast to domestic courts and 
even other international agreements, at the WTO there is a startling lack of 
transparency, public disclosure or accountability; [...][T]he WTO is intentionally 
designed to insulate against democratic pressure for change”36. It is therefore 
necessary to go beyond NGO participation in Ministerial Conferences and all the 
opportunities for debating and exchanging that the Organization has offered over the 
last 10 years in order to isolate past and new challenges.  
 
An undisputed improvement of the WTO over GATT lies in the pressure the WTO 
agreements have brought to bear for increased civil society participation in national 
governance. In fact, provisions to grant private participatory rights and opportunities 
at the national level are present in many WTO sub-agreements, which was not the 
case with GATT. For example, the Agreement on Safeguards states that a 
government’s investigation shall provide for public hearings (or other appropriate 
means) in which importers, exporters, and other interested parties can present 
evidence and views. The GATS states that where appropriate, WTO Members “shall 
work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations towards the establishment and adoption of common international 
standards and criteria for recognition and common international standards for the 
practice of relevant services trades and professions”. The Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) provides that before adopting a standard, a national 
standardizing body is to allow a period of at least 60 days for interested parties to 
submit comments on the draft standard (unless urgent problems arise). Furthermore, 
the standardizing body is required to “take into account” such comments. The Anti-
dumping Agreement has an Article on “Public Notice and Explanation of 
Determinations” and also requires that the anti-dumping authorities provide 
opportunities for interested parties to present evidence and for consumer 
organizations to provide information. WTO member governments have gone even 
further in providing for private participatory rights in the context of accession 
agreements when governments join the WTO. In the negotiations with China, China 
agreed to provide an opportunity for public comment on all new draft laws and 
regulations affecting trade; this mandatory public comment period, Charnovitz adds, 
clearly exceeds the requirements of existing WTO rules.  
 
To summarize, “WTO law requires governments to maintain a large degree of 
transparency and some degree of participation for the benefit of traders and other 
interested persons, demonstrating an acknowledgement by governments that 
transparency and participation are important ingredients in good governance at the 
national level. [...] Unfortunately, WTO member governments have adopted a 
different and inconsistent position with regard to norms for WTO transparency and to 
the participation of nonstate actors in the policy and rulemaking activities of the 
                                                 
35 Charnovitz S. (2005), “Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization”, the George 
Washington University Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No 142, forthcoming in the Rutgers Law 
Review. 
36 Wallach L. and P. Woodall (2004), Whose Trade Organization? A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO 15-16. 
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WTO”37. Some progress has been made by the WTO at the national level, with 
deficiencies remaining at the WTO level38.  
 
Trade SIAs have emerged against this particular background in a rather coherent 
fashion. The WTO urged member countries to improve transparency and 
participation in their own governance; Trade SIAs supported and extended this push 
inside the EU with a focus (at least implicitly) on increasing intra-EU participation.  
 
Let us now travel back seven years. Many NGOs welcomed the EU Trade SIA 
initiative “as a necessary first step to ensure that the EU’s negotiating position at the 
WTO and in bilateral trade agreements was conducive to sustainable development, 
while enhancing transparency and accountability in EU trade policy-making” 39. 
 
“A key advantage of SIA,” the WWF wrote in 2000, “is that it provides a platform for 
increased transparency and stakeholder involvement. SIA effectively provides a clear 
and structured approach that can be used to inform and involve stakeholders in the 
development of trade policies, in line with the EU’s international commitments. As 
well as enhancing the sense of public ownership and trust in resulting policies, 
greater participation often also opens up a new source for information for policy 
makers. SIAs can therefore benefit policy-makers and stakeholders, and thus help 
bridge the gap between EU policies, and their local impacts” 40. 
 
Though welcomed and acknowledged at the onset as a breakthrough in trade policy-
making, monitoring and assessment, Trade SIAs have come short of fulfilling all NGO 
expectations. A careful reading of the NGO Joint Statements on Trade SIAs, issued 
in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 confirms this point.  
Hence, on 23 February 2000, NGOs jointly stated that “To date, the European 
Commission’s SIA has not been effectively deployed to inform and foster inter-
departmental discussions in any significant way, let alone to mobilise all the 
necessary expertise within the Commission. [...] Neither have the European 
Parliament nor the national parliaments of Member States been involved in the SIA 
process with a view to informing national debates on trade policy-making. [...] In 
short, we believe that the potential of the SIA process to make EU trade policy 
sustainable has not even begun to be used”41. 
The core objection raised in 2000, which was to pervade subsequent NGO 
statements, lies in the fragmentation of participation, with NGOs, civil society and 
non-decision-making EC officials on the one hand, and remote EC decision-makers 
behind closed doors on the other: “SIAs are being conducted at arms length from 
policy-making, and policy makers are not sufficiently involved in the SIA process”.42. 
Read also, the same year: “For SIAs to serve their purpose they must be at the heart 
                                                 
37 Charnovitz (2005) op cit. 
38 See for instance Charnovitz S. (2005), “Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization”, the 
George Washington University Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No 142, forthcoming in the 
Rutgers Law Review. 
39 “Joint NGO Statement on the Sustainability Impact Assessment of EU Trade Policy”, 8 July 2002. 
40 WWF (2002). “Changing the Balance of Trade”, WWF Briefing on Sustainability Assessment of EU Trade 
Policy, July 2002.  
41 “Joint NGO Statement on the EU Sustainability Impact Assessment of WTO trade liberalization”, 23 Feb 2000. 
42 “Joint NGO Statement on Sustainability Impact Assessment of EU Trade Policy”, 8 July 2002. 
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of the policy-making process, otherwise they become little more than a bureaucratic 
exercise in greenwash”43. The same assertion is made in 2006, simply more bluntly: 
“Currently, the SIA programme and the trade policy-making process seem completely 
independent from each other”. 
 
In addition, what appeared constantly after the 2002 Statement was the limited 
involvement of the EU’s trading partners throughout the Trade SIA process: “The 
exclusion of civil society and governments from non-EU countries makes it 
particularly difficult to assess the impacts of trade policies at a local level.  SIAs are a 
starting point for an on-going process of consultation to allow informed responses 
from national and regional stakeholders. Only through an open and well structured 
consultation process can SIAs hope to bridge the gap between macro policy 
formulation and micro-level impacts”.44 
 
In the 2005 NGO statement, all the aforementioned objections and arguments are 
reasserted and reorganized across three lines, or “needs”: “primarily, the need to 
ensure that SIAs shape and reorient trade negotiations, and not vice versa; the need 
to improve the methodology; and finally the need to offer concrete solutions for 
ensuring high-level commitment of key decision-makers to, and involvement in, the 
SIA process, as well as its integration within decision-making”45. 
 
4.2. Challenges 
 
Shaping trade negotiations, improving methodology, particularly by ensuring third 
country involvement and by taking due consideration of market realities (market 
failure, winners and losers) and, finally, policy integration through the enhancement 
of inter-service coordination and the expansion of other EU institutions’ exposure to, 
and input in, the SIA process, remain three unmet challenges related to participation 
(figure 3). 
 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 “NGO Statement on the Draft Handbook for Sustainability Impact Assessment”, April 2005. 
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Figure 3: “Better participation” is needed to meet Trade SIA requirements 
 
Trade SIA requirements 
Ensure SIAs are integrated during negotiations. 
Shape trade negotiations Ensure involvement of third countries.
Improve the methodology Ensure the impact assessment reflects the “reality of the market”:
Deepen policy integration Market power, market failures, effective “winners” and “losers” of trade liberalization.
Expand other EU institutions’ exposure to, and input in, the SIA process.
Enhance policy coherence and inter-service coordination 
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5. From market access to collective preferences 
 
5.1. The story so far 
 
Trade SIAs were born the same year as the publication of the Economic Theory of 
GATT by Bagwell and Staiger. It is puzzling to see that no academic had ever 
exposed the economics of GATT before. Many papers dealt with the gains and 
consequences of freer trade, but none had worked within a unified theoretical 
framework to answer simple questions such as: if gains are expected from unilateral 
liberalization, why is multilateral liberalization both binding and necessary? What is 
the rationale for “reciprocity” and “non-discrimination”, which are core principles of 
GATT and the WTO? Bagwell and Staiger answered by demonstrating that GATT is 
an indispensable institution enabling large and overprotected countries to escape the 
prisoner’s dilemma by conceding market access to one another on a reciprocal basis 
and hence removing strategic tariffs46. In their model, two components are put 
forward to explain a given tariff level. First, a strategic component, whereby a country 
aims to modify the export/import price ratio so as to minimize import expenses and/or 
maximize export revenues. A large importing country, for instance, should set a 
strategic tariff that would depress world prices and reduce the country’s import bill. 
The other component reflects political preferences concerning protection. The latter 
does not aim to manipulate world prices. The GATT rationale, according to Bagwell 
and Staiger, is to exhaust the strategic component of protection through reciprocal 
tariff cuts. Reciprocal exchange of market access between large countries is at the 
core of GATT. 
 
“However”, Ederington added two years later, “as tariff barriers have fallen, attention 
has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers. A primary 
concern is that, as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to 
pursue trade goals through trade policy, there will be unilateral incentives for 
                                                 
46 See Bagwell K. and R.W. Staiger (1999), “An Economic Theory of GATT”.  The American Economic Review 
89(1): 215-248. 
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governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection”47. 
GATT contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic 
policies, but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within GATT 
negotiations remains contentious. “Indeed, at both the Ministerial Meeting in 1994 (at 
the close of the Uruguay Round) and the recent unsuccessful Ministerial Conference 
in Seattle, many GATT delegates renewed demands for the relationship between 
trade and various domestic policies (e.g., environmental policies, labor standards, or 
competition policy) to be examined”48.  
 
What occurred in trade negotiations after Seattle makes the trade negotiation 
process look like an uneasy walk on two legs, the first one being conventional market 
access negotiations, particularly for developing countries’ products, the second one 
the full incorporation of domestic policies – or “behind-the-border” measures – within 
the trade liberalization agenda. The rationale for enlarging the scope of trade 
negotiations to behind-the-border measures may be found in the reciprocity principle 
itself. To work properly with more than 140 countries with heterogeneous protection 
structures, a logical strategy was to enlarge the bargaining forum that the WTO 
offered to its members. What a country could not concede on market access might 
be conceded on domestic policies, for investment or services, for instance, and vice 
versa. But the failure of the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003 shelved 
negotiations on behind-the-border measures (at least those related to the so-called 
Singapore issues49) and refocused WTO talks on its primarily GATT-inherited 
objective of securing market access commitments50. Back to GATT fundamentals 
then, and no big deal for Trade SIAs? Not exactly, because trade talks kept hitching 
and, in July 2006, ultimately led WTO talks that were deadlocked on the protection-
free trade axis closer to free trade than they were after Seattle. 
 
A second main difference with Seattle lies in the convergence of the Doha 
development objective and the growing competition between world trade general 
equilibrium models since the Doha Round was launched. The development objective 
required market access to be valuable to development. Simulation models ought to 
have proved this, and some did. But most did not. Overall simulated gains from trade 
shrank along with the emergence of new models and scenarios. Losses at the 
country and household levels clearly appeared as an immediate consequence of 
Doha’s most recent scenarios, sending out the worrying signal that some of the 
losing countries and households would be found among the poorest51.  
 
“In the early years of this decade, as the World Trade Organization’s “Doha Round” 
of multilateral trade negotiations began to take shape, simulations carried out by the 
World Bank suggested that the world economy would be as much as $800 billion 
richer with an ambitious and successful trade round, and approximately two-thirds of 
these gains would be appropriated by developing countries. The picture presented by 
                                                 
47 Ederington J. (2001), “International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies”, The American Economic 
Review 91(5): 1580-1593. 
48 Id. 
49 Investment, Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation, for which 
negotiations should be engaged, as agreed upon during the 1996 WTO Singapore Conference. 
50 See for instance Bagwell K., Mavroidis P.C. and R.W. Staiger (2002), “It’s a Question of Market Access”, 
American Journal of International Law 96(1): 56-76. 
51 See Chabe-Ferret S., Gourdon J., Marouani M.A. and T. Voituriez (2006). ”Trade-Induced Inequalities: 
Assessment Issues and Policy Implications for Developing Countries”. Paper presented at the World Bank 
ABCDE Annual Conference, Tokyo 29-30 May 2006. 
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the models today is very different. The global increases in real income predicted from 
the Doha Round have shrunk, and the gains for developing countries appear now to 
be vanishingly small – raising doubts about the Round’s very reason for being” 
(Subsidy Watch, Issue 2, July 2006). 
 
A careful reading of the most enthusiastic World Bank simulations was made by Mark 
Weisbrot in fall 2005. The director of the CEPR corrected some of the misleading 
untruths contained in a World Bank Press Release published after the World Bank 
research study, Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, 
edited by Anderson and Martin52 a few weeks before the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference. The exact content of the study is rather different from what was claimed 
in the World Bank press release53. Gains for developing countries stemming 
disproportionately from greater access to developed economies were already 
questioned by trade economists such as Panagariya in 200454.  
The fact that overall estimated gains shrank over time along with the updating of, and 
competition between, different CGEs, combined with the fact that according to all 
latest simulations half of the gains from liberalization occur thanks to developing 
countries’ own trade liberalization, would together support the argument that the 
world trading system is much less indispensable to developing countries and to 
“development” than claimed. We will not get involved in controversy over this issue. 
What we would however like to stress, sticking to Bagwell and Staiger’s theoretical 
GATT/WTO model, is that the rationale for a multilateral trading system given by 
large and overprotected countries caught in a prisoner’s dilemma situation may have 
eroded between 1947, when GATT principles were enacted, and 2006, when the 
number of member countries had swelled, average tariffs had sharply declined, and 
consequently the case for large and overprotected countries representing WTO 
archetypal members had weakened.  
We seem to be close to the “breakeven” point that some countries seemed to argue 
over after Hong Kong, especially the EU, suggesting that going beyond would imply 
going against domestic political preferences. If the claim is true, such countries would 
be closer in 2006 than they were in 1999 to the point where efficiency gains (in 
market terms) brought about by strategic trade liberalization might be outweighed by 
collective losses – what Bagwell and Staiger call the political preferences for 
protection. Uncertainty about this situation, more than the occurrence of this situation 
itself, could convincingly explain why negotiations derailed. On what basis should a 
country actually believe that other countries have exhausted the “strategic” or 
“aggressive” part of their tariff, so that the remaining protection only mirrors the 
political preferences of the society?  
5.2. Challenges 
 
This question is crucial, for the capacity to answer will determine the future direction 
of the world trading system, either towards a conservative institution dealing with 
                                                 
52 The study was finally issued in 2006. See Anderson K. and W. Martin (eds.) (2006). Agricultural Trade Reform 
& The Doha Development Agenda. The World Bank, Washington DC and Palgrave Macmillan. 
53 CEPR Press Release, November 22, 2005. http://www.cepr.net/pressreleases/2005_11_22.htm 
54 Panagariya A. (2004). “Agricultural Liberalization and the Developing Countries: Debunking the Fallacies”. 
Mimeo, Columbia University, New York. 
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market access, and market access only, or towards a flexible one integrating different 
countries’ collective preferences into a common framework. How can we assess 
whether or not a country has exhausted the “strategic” part of its tariff, so that the 
remaining protection only mirrors the political preferences of the society? This is the 
first challenge raised in this respect. It implies isolating collective preference motives 
for departing from free trade from strategic motives. 
 
The last challenge relates to the widening of the bargaining forum and its extension 
to services trade and investment in an attempt to overcome the agricultural 
protectionist bias while making the reciprocity principle still deliver.  
 
6. Conclusion: A summary of challenges 
 
If we streamline and reorganize the challenges listed under “development shift”, 
“better participation” and “collective preferences”, the issues at stake in the trade 
liberalization and sustainable development debate, we end up with a list of seven 
new, interrelated challenges. Participation opens and closes the list (table 2). 
  
Table 2: A summary of challenges 
Challenges
Challenge 1: Policy integration within a SD framework
Challenge 2: Understand country preferences towards trade-related SD issues
Challenge 3: Who gains who loses (household level)
Challenge 4: Who gains who loses (over time, eg dynamic effects)
Challenge 5: Who gains who loses (value chain stages)
Challenge 6: Sector specific issues : services trade
Challenge 7: Sector specific issues : Investment
Challenge 8: "Better" participation  
 
 
At the core of the new challenges lie distributional issues. Between the too-limiting 
assumptions of trade SIAs over the variables of political choice scattered throughout 
economic, environmental and social effects on the one hand, and the political 
economy approach on the other, wherein all preferences should be conveyed through 
organised lobbies competing for public support, a bridge has to be built. Bridging 
these two strands of expertise and literature would lead to integrating more political 
economy into trade SIAs, meaning focusing more on gainers and losers, and, 
conversely, opening up our understanding of the political economy of trade 
negotiations through the integration of non-market impact variables that have been 
explored by trade SIAs. To help do so, it seems required to explore the possible 
extension of Trade SIAs to controversial sectors or “issue areas”, while correlating 
them with different governments’ motives to engage in trade liberalisation or 
protection.  
 
 
